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Twenty Years of the Regulation Approach: 





The regulation approach (hereafter 'RA') has enjoyed acclaim for some twenty years as 
a leading paradigm in the revival of institutional and evolutionary economics and the 
more general development of 'new political economy'. Its several schools all adopt a 
heterodox account of capital accumulation and emphasise the latter's socially 
embedded, socially regularized nature. They focus on the historically contingent 
ensembles of complementary economic and extra-economic mechanisms and practices 
which enable relatively stable accumulation to occur over relatively long periods despite 
the fundamental contradictions, crisis-tendencies, and conflicts generated by capitalism 
(on different schools, see Jessop 1990). These ideas have been applied most famously 
to 'Fordism' and 'post-Fordism' and extensive interest therein from the mid-80s to mid-
90s certainly contributed to the RA's popularity. But even the initial Parisian work 
addressed other topics and subsequent work has seen  a real deepening and widening 
of the regulation approach far beyond issues of Fordism and/or post-Fordism. 
 
These more recent trends are my primary concern below. Since a short survey cannot 
cover all relevant material, I will provide a general account of the RA's successive 
generations and developmental trajectories. I then illustrate this account by reviewing 
the Parisian 'state of the art' and the theoretical innovations introduced by other 
theorists. I also consider the RA's responses to the failure of its initial alternative 
economic strategy (due, it should be noted, to lack of adoption rather than subsequent 
implementation failure) and its relative isolation within mainstream economics; and I 
also examine how the RA's message has been received and understood outside the 
discipline of economics. I conclude by asking whether the twenty years of research, 
scholarship, and exposition invested in the RA have been worth the effort (the standard 
RA survey is Boyer 1990; on more recent work, see also Boyer and Saillard 1995a). 
 
I - Genesis and Agenda of the Regulation Approach 
 
The RA is sometimes mistakenly identified solely with the Parisian école de la régulation 
of economists such as Aglietta, Boyer, and Lipietz. Its very first work began circulating 
in 1974, was published in modified form in 1976, and translated into English in 1979 
(Aglietta 1974, 1979). Parisian output has since continued unabated. It has been taken 
up in various disciplines. Many scholars now employ such core Parisian concepts as 
'accumulation regime' (hereafter 'AR') and 'mode of regulation' (hereafter MoR) or at 
least refer to purportedly regulationist notions such as (post-)Fordism. Other regulation 
'schools' do exist, of course; but they have been far less influential. Thus, at the risk of 
perpetuating this fallacious reduction of regulationism to the the Parisian school, it is the 
latter which is the main focus of my article. 
 
This school initially comprised a group of 'polytechnicians' connected to the state 
planning apparatus rather than directly employed in the academic world. As 
professional economists, its members were theoretically inspired by radical economics 
(notably Marx, Keynes, Kalecki); as 'soixante-huitards', i.e., intellectuals shaped by May 
1968, they were ideologically sympathic to the organized working class and the radical 
politics of communist, maoist, or extreme left currents; and, as technocratic policy 
advisers within the state itself, their avowed preference was for an economic and social 
modernisation based on socialist planning, democratic participation, and progressive 
class compromise. The starting point for the regulationist agenda was a critique of neo-
classical economics and structural marxism in the light of the emerging economic crisis 
of the mid-1970s. They hoped thereby to prepare the ground for an alternative account 
of Atlantic Fordism, its economic crisis, and the impasse of state planning and 
Keynesian welfarism. This theoretical agenda found its political expression in an 
alternative economic strategy for France that could be pursued by a relatively 
autonomous state to promote a new class compromise and new structural forms and 
norms of production and consumption appropriate to the new economic circumstances 
(Dosse 1992a: 201-2; 1992b: 334-348; Aglietta 1994; Coriat 1994; Lipietz 1993, 1994; 
Vercellone 1994). Given its importance for assessing the achievements of the original 
regulationist project, I now present this two-pronged critique. 
 
On the first front, as a heterodox minority, the Parisian regulationists hoped to persuade 
the majority of their fellow economists in France (and elsewhere) that orthodox 
economics did not understand how real economies operated. They criticized it on three 
main grounds. They rejected its key assumption that there is a clearly delimited, socially 
disembedded sphere of economic relations with a tendency toward general equilibrium. 
They denied that this sphere's rationality and dynamic can be adequately analyzed in 
the first instance (if not, indeed, entirely) in terms of pure exchange relations in perfect 
markets. And they disputed that exchange relations are entirely driven by the 
optimizing, economizing behaviour of pre-constituted rational individuals with pre-given 
and stable preference functions who then orient their actions exclusively to the price 
mechanism. 
 
Against these ideas, regulationists suggested that economic relations were always 
socially embedded. This does not exclude analyses of economic forms, such as the 
wage-relation or price mechanism; it does require putting them in their social context. 
Thus Aglietta, the pioneer regulationist, proposed 'a theory of social regulation (as) a 
complete alternative to the theory of general equilibrium' (1979: 13). In turn he 
suggested studying regulation in terms of 'the transformation of social relations as it 
creates new forms that are both economic and non-economic, that are organized in 
structures and themselves reproduce a determinant structure, the mode of production' 
(1979: 13, 16). Regulationists also rejected the neo-classical views that time could be 
safely discounted or ignored2 and that any temporal development is essentially 
reversible.3 Instead, they argued that economic development is largely path-dependent 
and irreversible. They added, against the orthodoxy, that economic, political, and social 
institutions matter and should therefore be seen as endogenous economic factors.4 For 
they shape economic subjects, differentiate modes of production, and modify 
capitalism's dynamic, crisis-tendencies, and temporalities. They should certainly not be 
seen as wholly exogenous sources of rigidity and disturbance for a socially 
disembedded market economy that would otherwise function perfectly -- which, if true, 
would, of course, justify neo-liberal calls for a return to a golden (but mythical) laissez-
faire past. And, third, in place of an atomistic and trans-historical homo economicus, 
they focused on shared and changing norms of production and consumption and 
changing modes of economic calculation. This is shown in their concerns with the 
diffusion of norms of mass production and consumption in establishing the Atlantic 
Fordist model and with post-Fordist struggles over flexibility. 
 
On the second front, Parisian regulationists criticized 'structural Marxism' for providing a 
wholly inadequate account of capitalism. Whilst retaining the key Althusserian ideas that 
the capitalist mode of production (or CMP) had relatively autonomous economic, 
political, and ideological regions and that accumulation was 'overdetermined' by their 
complex articulation, they also offered three main criticisms. First, they rejected the 
structuralist account of the quasi-automatic reproduction of the CMP. Althusser had 
suggested that, because of the determining role of the economic 'in the last instance', 
capitalist reproduction was almost guaranteed once the CMP was consolidated  
(Althusser and Balibar 1977). This largely philosophical argument, without firm 
foundations in Marx's own work, implied that capitalist relations of production were 
reproduced 'behind the backs of the producers' regardless of the intentions or actions of 
economic agents. Opposing this mechanistic account, regulationists stressed the 
improbability of capitalist reproduction and examined the changing conditions which 
allowed production and consumption in different stages of capitalism to be combined 
temporarily into a virtuous circle of accumulation. They also aimed to bring subjects 
back into the picture. They denied economic agents were merely passive 'supports' 
(Träger) of social relations of production and, instead, examined the social processes 
and struggles which defined and stabilized modes of economic calculation and norms of 
economic conduct. Indeed, without taking account of the subjects who acted as bearers 
of structures, it was virtually impossible to theorize how contradictions could ever be 
even temporarily stabilized (cf. Lipietz 1973). 
 
They argued, secondly, that institutions matter and change over time. Whereas 
structural marxism tended to see capitalism as eternal and unchanging, regulationists 
saw it as crisis-prone and discontinuous. It occurs in stages, each with its own 
distinctive institutional framework and crisis-tendencies; and, far from being guaranteed, 
the transition between stages depends on chance discoveries and is always mediated 
by open-ended class struggles. Thirdly, regulationists distinguished between the overall 
logic of the capital relation and its structural forms, on the one hand, and, on the other 
hand, the strategies deployed by particular social forces (cf. Boyer 1990: 32; Dosse 
1992b: 340-1). This is especially clear in their emphasis on the wage relation 
understood in broad terms (rapport salarial) and, in this context, regulationists stressed 
the changing forms and modalities of economic class struggle. 
 
These battles involve an attack on two wings of the same theoretical enemy. For, 
despite marked differences between orthodox economics and structural marxism, they 
both offer an essentially static and essentialist account of the (capitalist) economy and 
its inertia. Regulationists highlighted the antagonisms, contradictions, and crises 
generated by capitalism and how it developed discontinuously in and through class 
struggle. Thus, to the mechanistic accounts of reproduction offered by neo-classical 
economics and structural marxism, Aglietta and his colleagues counterposed the 
dynamic concept of régulation. This notion emphasizes the historically contingent 
economic and extra-economic mechanisms which lead economic agents to act in 
specific circumstances in accordance with the unevenly changing, objective 
requirements of capitalist reproduction. 
 
In discussing regulation, the RA distinguishes the roles of market and non-market 
forces. It goes well beyond the narrow concerns of orthodox economics with production 
functions, economizing behaviour, and pure market forces. It considers a wide range of 
institutional factors and social forces directly and indirectly involved in accumulation. In 
particular, whilst far from forgetful about the essentially anarchic role of exchange 
relations (market forces) in mediating capitalist reproduction, the RA stresses the 
complementary functions of other mechanisms (institutions, norms, conventions, 
networks, procedures, and modes of calculation) in structuring, facilitating, and guiding 
(in short, 'regulating') accumulation. Conversely, in contrast to structural marxism, 
which, for all its rhetorical insistence on 'economic determination in the last instance', 
displayed little interest in the precise mechanisms which allegedly guaranteed this 
ultimately determining role, the pioneering regulationists took economic forms and 
institutions very seriously. Thus, in conducting this battle on two fronts, the RA began 
the task of integrating radical political economy with analyses of the state and civil 
society to show how economic and extra-economic factors interact to stabilize the 
capital relation. In short, they were equally concerned with the economic (market-
mediated) mode of economic regulation and 'the social (or extra-economic) modes of 
economic regulation'. 
 
II - Regenerating the Regulation Approach 
 
The RA has since diffused widely and undergone several theoretical changes. These 
can be analysed in terms of successive generations. This possibility was mooted by 
Boyer (1990a, 1990b) when he called for a 'second generation' of studies. Generation 
does not refer here to different intellectual cohorts with distinct memberships, however, 
as with the first, second, and third generations of Frankfurt Critical Theory. Instead it 
refers to successive steps in a developing research paradigm taken by a growing and 
changing band of regulationists. Some 'first-generation' Parisian analysts have 
advanced second- and third-generation research; others have moved away from the RA 
problematic in part or in whole. Conversely, whilst some more recent recruits have 
helped widen and deepen the RA agenda, others are still working happily with first 
generation notions. This complicates attempts to distinguish generations in simple 
chronological terms. It does not exclude a more complex analysis in terms of uneven 
development in the RA, its cross-fertilization with other disciplines, and the role of 
changing economic and/or political circumstances in France as these have shaped the 
RA agenda theoretically as well as in terms of alternative economic policies and political 
strategies. 
 
Adopting these criteria, one can distinguish three kinds of theoretical shift in the RA. 
These comprise: simple, incremental empirical extensions of the RA to new research 
areas -- notably to national economies other than the USA and France, to micro- and 
meso-level analyses of sectors and branches rather than the staying at the macro-level, 
and to various spatial scales below or above the national; a more complex, progressive 
conceptual deepening of the RA's account of already established regulationist topics 
through more detailed concern with their concrete and complex mediation, 
overdetermination, and instantiation; and ruptural theoretical redefinitions of older 
themes which break with earlier RA work by undermining its previously unquestioned 
assumptions, concepts, and arguments. Stepwise expansion and deepening5 is closely 
linked to the later work of the first generation, as seen in studies by Aglietta, Boyer, 
Delorme, Lipietz, and Mistral, or more senior second generation recruits, such as Coriat. 
Discontinuous redefinition more often marks the input of new waves of theorists (e.g., 
geographers, state theorists, discourse analysts, feminists) as they link -- and rethink -- 
regulationist ideas, concepts, and arguments with their own prior and emerging 
concerns. 
 
These patterns are combined in different ways. In state theory, for example, first 
generation RA studies largely neglected the state; second generation work introduced 
extant state concepts into the RA without considering their complementarity with basic 
regulationist arguments; and a third generation has begun to develop a coherent and 
explicitly regulationist view of the state and integrate it into the RA (see below). 
Regarding space and locality, however, whereas some first generation scholars took 
these issues seriously (notably Aglietta and Lipietz), second generation work tended to 
treat the national economy and national state as the principal (and taken-for-granted) 
space of regulation. This lapse could be due to the actual primacy of the national 
economies and states under Atlantic Fordism -- which is the focus of so much 
regulationist analysis. Only recently has a third generation re-discovered spatial 
variation, attempted to explore micro-macro problems, and asked how 'space' and 
'scale' come to be produced and reproduced in and through regulation and governance. 
A third trajectory appears in attempts by discourse theorists to deconstruct basic RA 
concepts in order to rescue the overall approach from essentialism and class 
reductionism and connect it to studies of economic hegemony and domination. 
 
The most significant examples of incremental extension occur in the work of Robert 
Boyer, the current doyen of the Parisian school. Whilst remaining committed to the core 
concepts of the original approach, Boyer has been its most active and prolific developer. 
His theoretical and empirical research concerns a wide range of substantive issues, 
ranging across different levels of analysis from micro to macro, covering different spatial 
scales, dealing with various historical and prospective as well as current issues, 
adopting methods ranging from econometrics through game theory and institutionalism 
to scenario analysis, and studying not only a wide range of advanced capitalist 
economies but also various socialist and post-socialist economies from the former 
Soviet bloc. In engaging in such a wide-ranging intellectual project, Boyer has extended 
the RA in many ways. He has shown how it can be used to analyze specific sectors, the 
specificities of Japanese capitalism, the origins of the grand crisis in the Soviet bloc, 
developments in the Fordist wage relation, the effects of technological change, 
problems of economic governance, alternative post-Fordist scenarios, the emergence of 
economic conventions, and much else besides. At the same time, and not by accident, 
Boyer has creatively drawn on assumptions, concepts, and hypotheses from other 
approaches. These include the 'new French social sciences' (Wagner 1994), rational 
choice and transaction cost analyses, work on governance, institutionalism, and 
comparative political economy. In skillfully linking these with the RA, he has also 
contributed to its progressive deepening. 
 
Alongside this partial appropriation by Parisian regulationists of other approaches, 
progressive deepening of the RA more generally has been advanced by its 
appropriation and transformation in turn by scholars located beyond both heterodox and 
mainstream economics. Taking seriously the RA's potential to shed new light on their 
own disciplinary concerns, they have articulated it with their own conceptual frameworks 
and expertise. They have explored the concrete and complex mediation of structural 
forms and modes of economic regulation; studied how they come to be overdetermined 
by, and structurally coupled to, other institutional orders and/or the wider 'lifeworld'; and 
examined how MoRs are instantiated in specific contexts. This is especially important, 
as indicated above, in furthering the RA's role outside economics. For, even with its 
much expanded definition of the economy (to include accumulation regimes and their 
social and economic modes of regulation) and its commitment to institutional and 
evolutionary analysis, the Parisian RA itself remains firmly rooted in the discipline of 
economics. Its 'totalizing' perspective is capital accumulation understood in broad terms. 
It therefore lacks many central concepts for dealing with other institutional orders (such 
as the state, law, science, technology, education, the military, and the mass media) and 
with the social dynamics of civil society, the public sphere, the politics of identities and 
social movements, and the lifeworld. This deficit has created the basis for non-
economists to explore the overdetermination of régulation by extra-economic factors as 
well as to examine how regulation of capitalism impacts upon other parts of the social 
formation. 
 
Finally, if incremental extension and progressive deepening operate primarily through 
linking RA concepts to complementary concepts from other disciplines, ruptural 
redefinition occurs when other approaches are used to deconstruct core concepts from 
the RA instrumentarium to enhance its overall analytical and explanatory potential. This 
third mode of theoretical development is most evident in the discourse analytic critique 
of basic concepts such as AR (cf. Scherrer 1995; Torfing 1997) or economic agency (cf. 
Jenson 1990, 1995). And, in admittedly more limited ways, the same trend has occurred 
in the RA itself as some Parisians seek to develop more solid micro-foundations in 
response to the counter-attack from mainstream economics, rational choice theories, 
and the analysis of economic conventions. In doing so, however, they appear to be 
abandoning, at least for some purposes, some of the core radical assumptions of the 
original RA with its stress on the antagonistic nature of the capital-labour relation and 
the inevitability of class struggle (cf. Coriat 1994; Lipietz 1993, 1994, 1995b; for an 
extended discussion, see Jessop 1997a). 
 
An alternative account of RA generations can be constructed if one examines the 
impact of the changing economic and political conjuncture in which the Parisian school 
has operated. The first generation of work was shaped by the emerging crisis of 
Fordism, the attempt to understand its specificities, and the formulation of an alternative 
economic strategy to introduce a 'New Deal for post-Fordism'.6 The victory of the Union 
de la Gauche in the 1981 French elections created the opportunity for certain regulation 
theorists (notably Aglietta, Boyer, Coriat, Lipietz, and Mistral) to become, at the request 
of Jacques Attali, advisers to the Socialist government. They hoped that this victory 
signified a shift in the balance of forces within the state as well in the wider society and 
that this would enable the state to promote a new institutionalized compromise around a 
strategy of an 'offensive flexibility' for labour rather than capital. But their advice was 
rejected. At first the Socialist regime pursued old-style Keynesianism in one country (a 
return to an already exhausted mode of regulation) together with a more productivist 
restructuring programme to make French industry more competitive based on 
technological modernization (without taking account of the need to refound the wage 
relation). When the Keynesian approach failed (as the Parisian RA predicted), the 
government adopted a neo-liberal programme of austerity and 'defensive flexibility' (a 
return, according to these regulationists, to the economic policies that produced the 
depression of the 1930s). In addition to the government's rejection of the regulationist 
strategy, the Parisian school was also rebuffed by organized business and a divided 
labour movement. 
 
This prompted a reorientation of the Parisian RA which is reflected in its above-
mentioned incremental extension and progressive deepening. Vercellone (1994) sees 
the neo-liberal turn as a decisive turning point in the work of the Parisian RA. It marked 
the exhaustion of its initial political project, precipitated the erosion of its political 
cohesion as its members turned to different political strategies, and encouraged a 
theoretical as well as political division between those RA scholars who continued to 
explore the role of institutionalized class compromises in regulation (including those 
hoping that to find a new compromise as the basis for a progressive post-Fordism) and 
those scholars who sought alternative micro-foundations for the regulation approach 
(and so began to move away from a concern with issues of class struggle) (Vercellone 
1994: 6, 24-28). There is some merit in this claim and it is confirmed by several leading 
members of the Parisian school. But one should not exaggerate the extent of the 
cleavage thereby introduced. For some leading scholars can be found on both sides of 
the divide and even those who opt for one side or the other still identify with the school 
as a whole. Nonetheless this division is reflected in the different trajectories of certain 
first generation theorists. For example, Aglietta extended and deepened his existing 
interest in the international constraints on national modes of regulation, became more 
and more interested in problems of money, and advocated development of a European 
economic space as the basis of re-regulation; conversely, Lipietz's initial response was 
more nationalist and anti-European, he later turned towards the green movement and 
political ecology, and now favours a European-wide solution to the continuing crisis. 
These differences also reflect the changing strategic context beyond France in which 
the RA agenda was developing theoretically as well as politically. For, as Coriat (1994: 
131-3) notes, the 1980s saw the emerging hegemony of Anglo-American neo-liberalism, 
a re-shaping of the international economic hierarchy (especially with the growing 
significance of Japan with its own distinctive accumulation regime and mode of 
regulation), and new economic phenomena associated with the neo-liberal strategy of 
defensive flexibility. The extension of the RA to include the third world, post-socialism, 
and the newly industrializing economies of East Asia is a further reflection of this 
broader shift (see also Lipietz 1987, 1994). 
 
III - The State of the Art in the RA 
 
Having identified three ways in which, whilst maintaining broad commitment to its initial 
research programme, the RA may have changed, I will now examine the regulationist 
'state of the art'. To simplify this gargantuan task, I will first summarize some emergent 
themes in the recent handbook edited by Boyer and Saillard (1995a), which explicitly 
sets out to present the current state of knowledge from a Parisian viewpoint. This 
strategem is justified by the comprehensiveness of this veritable RA encyclopaedia, 
which comprises 54 chapters extending over 568 pages and includes contributions from 
36 French social scientists (mostly economists) and historians working directly or in 
sympathy with the Parisian school. I will then note some theoretical innovations 
associated with other analysts who acknowledge an affiliation to the Parisian school. 
The choice of analysts and topics for the second part of this examination lacks the same 
imprimatur as the first part but it should serve to illustrate the range of highly innovative 
work being done outside the Parisian core -- much of which was ignored in Boyer and 
Saillard's more Francocentric conspectus. 
 
A Parisian View of the State of Knowledge 
 
Incremental extension and progressive deepening of Parisian RA are especially clear in 
the chapters of Boyer and Saillard (1995a). In their own review of twenty years' work, 
the editors often refer to the extension of the original RA to take account of national 
variations and/or more recent developments in the still unresolved crisis of Atlantic 
Fordism (Boyer and Saillard 1995c). But they also identify other shifts. To illustrate this I 
will note changes in the analysis of accumulation regimes and modes of regulation and 
then consider each of the structural forms of the 'mode of regulation' -- defined by Boyer 
(1990) as the wage relation, the money form, competition, the state, and international 
regimes. 
 
Accumulation Regimes: having initally posited a three-stage, crisis-mediated succession 
of ARs (ancien régime, extensive or liberal, and intensive or monopoly) and been 
uncertain about the character of a fourth stage (neo- vs post-Fordism), the Parisian 
school has since identified a wide range of accumulation regimes, accepted that they no 
longer fit into a neat unilinear pattern, and shown how they vary across time and space. 
In their guise as economists, the Parisians have also conducted statistical analyses and 
econometric modelling of ARs at the macro-economic and sectoral levels. More recent 
work also shows much interest in the diverse sources of technological change that 
destabilize (and provoke transformations) in ARs; and in the diverse ways in which they 
are inserted into the international division of labour (e.g., rentier regimes, bloody 
Taylorism, peripheral Fordism, small open economies, newly industrializing economies, 
post-socialist economies). The approach has also been creatively extended to socialist 
societies, their crises, and the problematic transition to capitalism (Andreff 1993; 
Chavance 1994; Boyer 1995c). There has been growing interest in what one might call 
the co-constitution of ARs and MoRs through comparative analysis of the articulation 
between the wage relation (and also other aspects of the MoR or institutionalized 
compromises) and different regimes of accumulation (e.g., flexi-fordism in Germany, 
flawed fordism in the UK, the Japanese model). Finally, as it becomes increasingly 
evident that the crisis of Fordism remains unresolved and ready assumptions about the 
post-Fordist future have been dashed, there has been more nuanced work on 
alternative post-Fordist scenarios in an era marked by globalization and regionalization. 
 
Modes of Regulation: from an initial concern with the structured coherence of regulation 
in essentially national accumulation regimes, the Parisian RA has extended its research 
agenda to include specific sectors (e.g., agriculture, services), different branches (cars, 
construction, finance), and sub- and/or supra-national regions (rural, urban, European). 
This is linked in turn to interest in the governance as well as regulation of sectors, 
branches, and spatial scales. The Parisian school has also worked on the loss of 
coherence of national MoRs under the impact of internationalization, financialization, 
tertiarization, technological change, expansion of the informal sector, etc.. It has 
attempted to formalize the analysis of structural forms, institutions, and regulation 
and/or provide it with more solid micro-foundations. And work on post-Fordist scenarios 
has been associated with work on alternative modes of regulation based on 
comparative studies as well as modelling and scenario analyses. 
 
Different structural forms have also received attention. The money form and wage 
relation were the two key starting points for the Parisian RA (Aglietta 1974). Money was 
initially seen as a fictitious commodity, taking different forms in different periods and so 
transforming the dynamic of accumulation; the distinctive stagflationary crisis of Fordism 
was traced in turn to the role of credit money in this AR and its articulation to the Fordist 
wage relation (collective bargaining, Keynesianism, collective consumption, and social 
security). Aglietta's subsequent work placed yet more emphasis on the central role of 
the money form (albeit no longer seen in Marxist value-theoretical terms) and on the 
incompressibility of the wage form in modern society (which he characterized as a 
'sociéte salariale'). He has developed a regulationist account of the duality of money as 
a structural form expressed in the contradiction between its roles as a national money 
and international currency. Whereas the former role is characterized by a unicité 
(unicity) linked to sovereign national states, the latter involves the plurality and anarchy 
of currency markets. This contradiction could be reconciled for a time in and through the 
emergence of one national money as the hegemonic international currency in pluri-
national currency blocs or world capitalism as a whole (Aglietta 1986). Lipietz has also 
undertaken important work on money but from a more value-theoretical viewpoint. He 
has studied money's role in mediating the 'esoteric' world of value and the 'exoteric' 
world of everyday economic life and has investigated the inflationary potential of the 
pseudo-validation of credit money during the Fordist period (Lipietz 1985). More 
generally, with the increased importance of internationalization, there has also been RA 
work on the subordination of money to financial arbitrage, the role of neo-liberalism in 
re-introducing constraints on inflationary tendencies, and the implications of monetarism 
for the wage relation. 
 
Regarding the wage relation itself, the Parisian RA has shifted focus from the 
correspondence between different forms of wage relation and accumulation regimes 
(especially between the Fordist wage relation in its heyday and the nature of 
monopolistic regulation) to the nature of sectoral variations, national variations, new 
forms of wage relation, new forms of social wage, and the re-segmentation of the 
labour-force after the collapse of the Fordist compromise. There has been growing 
interest in the social origins of wage relations and how they come to be institutionalized 
in different historical periods and/or different sectors and branches. This is consistent 
with the RA concern with the micro-regularities that form the basis for accumulation and 
regulation. Unsurprisingly, current work also focuses on alternative post-Fordist wage 
relations at the micro- and macro-levels and their potential contribution to the re-
stabilization of capitalism and/or the passage to a greener, more sustainable mode of 
development. 
 
Modes of competition: attention has turned from the oligopolistic competition linked to 
large firms and financial concentration characteristic of Fordist regulation to the impact 
of internationalization and the differentiation of products. There is now greater 
recognition of the variety of forms of inter-firm, inter-regional, and inter-national 
competition; the impact of vertical and horizontal integration, new forms of quasi-
integration (such as strategic alliances and networks), and the emerging role of 
governance mechanisms other than market and hierarchy. 
 
State and International Regimes: from the outset the state and international regimes 
were included among the basic structural forms in any MoR. The state was ascribed 
three key roles in this regard: guaranteeing certain economic and extra-economic 
preconditions for the profitable operation of capital; securing the economic and extra-
economic conditions for reproducing labour-power; and coordinating global flows of 
capital with national labour markets and addressing the resulting contradictions. The 
manner in which it served these functions and undertook specific economic policies was 
often seen as politically overdetermined by its 'relatively autonomous' role as a specific 
expression of institutionalized compromises. In this sense, then, the state, too, should 
be seen as socially embedded; it was not reducible to a rational planner nor to an 
instrument of monopoly capital. Its role in responding to the crisis of Fordism was to 
fashion a new institutionalized compromise that would underpin a new and dynamic 
'structured coherence' between the emerging accumulation regime and its mode of 
regulation. International regimes were likewise seen as stabilizing relations between 
different national economies and states (albeit organized in oligopolistic manner under 
British or American hegemony) and as regulating changing forms of internationalization 
(albeit marked by continuing uneven development). Second generation work showed 
more interest in the international constraints imposed on national regulation (Aglietta 
1994). More recently greater interest is also evident in whether a post-Bretton Woods 
international regime would need an associated super-state; in the impact of international 
instability on national MoRs; and in the emergence of new forms of disequilibria in the 
international division of labour. 
 
Parisian work has been largely conducted by economists, however, and this is reflected 
in a relative lack of interest in the state as such. Delorme has shown the most 
consistent concern with this topic and done most to integrate it into the RA. His second-
generation approach to the state as a relational, complex, integral entity7 is particularly 
concerned with the mode of public presence in the economy (or MPPE). The latter is 
essentially a theoretically-informed matrix and identifies three ways and four main sites 
in and through which states may intervene in the economy (Delorme 1991, 1992, 1995). 
Other Parisian theorists have begun to show renewed interest in economic policy 
(Lordon 1995). The most distinctive regulationist account of the state has been 
developed by Théret. This gives more weight to the relative autonomy of the state than 
is customary in the Parisian RA, explores the specificity of its economic order as a 
'fisco-financial' regime as well as its distinctive features as a political order, and 
examines the dialectic between instituted economic and political orders and 
economizing and political practices. Interestingly this third-generation approach is 
inspired by social topology and 'autopoiesis' (or self-organization) as well as Parisian 
RA (Théret 1990, 1992; for a more detailed summary, see Jessop 1997a). 
 
Outside Paris and Beyond 
 
Many studies undertaken outside Paris have largely followed the arguments of the first 
generation RA, ignoring subsequent developments, or, worse, have 'mistranslated' or 
vulgarized its claims. But there have also been some important innovations. These are 
less concerned with the economic dimensions of regulation, however, than with its 
social dimensions. Since it is impossible to deal with all of them, I will limit myself to just 
three: a) space; b) government and governance; and c) discourse and identity. 
 
There have been two important shifts in regulationist accounts of space: the first is a 
shift from concern with the regulation of pre-given spaces to the active production of 
spaces of regulation (Low 1995; Tickell and Peck 1993); and, second, linked to this, 
there has been a shift from the taken-for-grantedness of the national level as the site of 
regulation to interest in the multi-scalar nature of regulation and, indeed, the 
'relativization of scale' in the after-Fordist period (cf. Moulaert 1994; Swyngedouw 1996, 
1997; Benko and Lipietz 1995; Collinge 1996). 
 
On the first shift, Nick Low argues that the early RA tended to treat the geography of 
regulation as pre-inscribed within accumulation regimes and as altering 
unproblematically with the transition from one to another. He notes: 
The geography of regulation was thus initially conceived as a "space of regulation", 
a changing space economy impressed upon cities and regions by the mode of 
regulation originating at the global level [and] mediated by nation states. The 
influence of the global economy upon local developments can scarcely be disputed. 
But what is not yet clear is how much local variation in regulatory structures is 
possible, and to what extent emergent problems such as socio-spatial polarization 
and misallocation of investment is due to particular local mediations and how much 
to the ineluctable force of global capitalism (Low 1995: 10). 
It is now seen that scale/space is not a necessary feature of accumulation regimes and 
their modes of regulation but a contingent effect of the loose, differential coupling 
between political institutions and the economics of capitalism (Low 1995: 9, 20). There 
has also been interest in the discursive constitution of economic and political spaces 
and the struggles that occur over naming and mapping these spaces (Jenson 1995). 
Thus some have asked how a relatively closed national economy was naturalized both 
discursively and institutionally as the principal object of economic regulation in Atlantic 
Fordism (as compared to earlier pluri-national empires or the recent debate over 'global-
local' relations). This issue can be concretized by studying how different 'imagined' 
national economies co-evolved with different national Keynesian welfare states (Jessop 
1997b,c). Some have also questioned the capacity of flexible industrial districts to 
become the principal space of accumulation and regulation and, lacking a convincing 
answer, pondered the problems of finding a suitable spatial fix for post-Fordism (Tickell 
and Peck 1993). 
 
On the second shift, the Parisian RA still tends to prioritize the national level. Thus, if 
attention was directed elsewhere in early work, it was to consider complementarities 
among different national economies and/or to enquire how international regimes helped 
stabilize the external conditions for national accumulation regimes.8 This prioritization of 
the national economy and its national state may explain why the early RA showed little 
concern with local, urban, and regional spaces of regulation or, except for the 
grenoblois school, with supranational economic spaces. Indeed, Lipietz claimed that 
local and regional states lack the panoply of powers available to the nation-state as an 
instance of regulation; and both he and Boyer have made the same argument about 
supranational authorities (Lipietz 1994, 27-8; Boyer 1990: 39-40). 
 
This relative neglect of other scales is one of six 'missing links' noted in in Tickell and 
Peck's critique of the RA (1993). The subsequent discovery of these sub-national levels 
of regulation was linked to the crisis of Atlantic Fordism, resurgence of the local and 
regional as sites of uneven development, growing interest in flexible industrial districts, 
innovative milieux, etc., and a turn to supply-side policies implemented through local 
partnerships. The supra-national level has also been highlighted by the importance of 
the European Union, other supranational blocs, and the debate over globalization. More 
recent still has been an increasing interest in links among different scales of regulation 
and in the multi-scalar nature of modes of regulation which bear on any particular 
economic space (cf. Moulaert 1994, 14; Swyngedouw 1996, 1997; Jessop 1997). 
 
Lipietz is the first generation theorist who has done most work on space and uneven 
development (Lipietz 1978, 1980, 1988, 1994). His more recent work argues that space 
is a key aspect of economic regulation, suggesting it can appear both as a 'space in 
itself' and 'for itself'. In neither case, he emphasizes, need it coincide with national 
boundaries. A 'space in itself' consists in an 'economic region', i.e., 'an homogeneous 
area consisting of the articulation of modes and forms of production'. It is typically 
organized on different spatial scales (with internal differences, such as an urban-rural 
divide and urban hierarchies) but also has its own 'definite subregime of accumulation' 
such that expanded reproduction of capitalism can occur within its borders. A 'space for 
itself' exists insofar as social forces in that space form an 'historic bloc' (class coalition) 
which both articulates the identity and interests of the economic region and can defend 
these (in part through control of a state). Lipietz adds that Atlantic Fordism's golden age 
saw a marked overlap between spaces of capital accumulation and spaces associated 
with national states. Conversely, its crisis has prompted an extended inter-regional 
division of labour linking different national spaces as de-skilled assembly tasks are 
exported to peripheral Fordist economies (1994: 26-30). 
 
The state was soon recognized as a weakpoint in the RA: indeed, Boyer listed further 
work thereon among its second-generation tasks (1990). This may well be due to the 
Parisian theorists' disappointment, if not disenchantment, with the Socialist Government 
between 1981 and 1983 and the need to re-think the nature of its relative autonomy and 
role in institutionalized compromise (see above). Nonetheless, most of the innovative 
RA work on the state is due to non-Parisian theorists. 
 
Two key contributors are the Marxist state theorists, Joachim Hirsch and Bob Jessop 
each of whom has sought to identify changes in the form of the state and its functions 
which would contribute to the regularization of an emergent post-Fordist accumulation 
regime. Among other differences, Hirsch's analyses are primarily grounded in the 
German case, Jessop's in a comparison between Britain and other Atlantic Fordist 
economies; and Hirsch is more interested in the national state, Jessop in different 
scales of organization. This said, they agree that the Keynesian welfare state 
associated with Atlantic Fordism is in crisis and that a new state form is emerging. Thus 
Hirsch contrasts the Fordist Sicherheitsstaat (security state)9 and national 
Wettbewerbsstaat (or 'competition state').10 As presented by Hirsch, the former is 
essentially a Keynesian welfare national state in German colours; the latter is marked 
by its subordination of domestic policy to Standortpolitik (policies designed to promote 
place competitiveness) -- something common nowadays to most advanced capitalist 
economies -- and the tendential rise of totalitarian civil society (more characteristic, 
perhaps, of Germany). Similarly, Jessop distinguishes a Keynesian welfare national 
state (with three ideal-typical sub-species) which has a key role in regularizing Atlantic 
Fordism and a Schumpeterian workfare regime (or SWR) (also with three ideal typical 
sub-species) which allegedly complements an emerging post-Fordism. Jessop adds 
that, whereas the KWNS was primarily instituted at the national level, the SWR is 
characterized by the tendential de-nationalization of the state and a de-statization of 
politics.11 
More generally, Jessop's work combines a 'strategic-relational approach' to the state 
with a neo-Gramscian reading of the RA to generate a regulationist account of the 
institutional restructuring and strategic re-orientation of the state system in capitalism 
(cf. Jessop 1985, 1990, 1993, 1995). His work reveals major complementarities 
between the RA and (neo)-Gramscian state theory in their respective concerns with the 
economy and the state in their inclusive senses; it establishes a general view of the 
state as an object as well as subject of regulation; and it specifies political regimes that 
correspond overall in their economic and social roles to Atlantic Fordism and an 
emerging post-Fordism. 
 
Regulation theory is often accused of economism and structuralism and it is suggested 
that there is little 'culture' in its description or explanation. This is only partly true of first 
generation theory with its interest in struggles over new production and consumption 
norms and societal paradigms. The recent interest in 'conventions' suggests that the 
Parisian RA has recognized its importance once again -- even if other Parisian 
regulationists criticize their approach in this regard. The accusation is even less true of 
some recent work outside Paris. For there is now much interest in how MoRs help to 
constitute and naturalize their objects in and through the very process of regulation. 
This interest is evident in studies of Fordism in crisis and/or post-Fordism -- especially in 
Jenson's stimulating and original work (1989, 1990, 1993). There is also more emphasis 
on specific forms of identity formation and subject formation as well as an extension of 
the RA to include non-class movements and forces (cf. Steinmetz 1996) and the 
overdetermination of the wage relation and other aspects of regulation by gender, race, 
and ethnicity (e.g., Bakshi et al., 1995). 
 
[Jenson advocates analyses of historically developed sets of practices and meanings 
which provide the actual regulatory mechanisms for a specific mode of growth and 
broader 'societal paradigms'. This implies that economic crises involve more than a final 
encounter with pregiven structural limits. They are actually manifested and resolved in 
an interdiscursive field in which social forces assert their identities and interests. Newly 
visible and active forces emerge in a crisis and participate in the expanding universe of 
political discourse; they offer over alternative MoRs and societal paradigms and struggle 
to institutionalize a new compromise. If a new 'model of development' does becomes 
hegemonic, it establishes new rules for recognizing actors and defining interests 
(Jenson 1990: 666). Such comments highlight the discursive constitution of objects of 
regulation by showing how new paradigms may be constructed through the entry of new 
social subjects. 
 
IV - Critique and Counter-Critique 
 
In their foreword to a compendium of RA work, Boyer and Saillard noted that 'many 
advances have passed unnoticed in so far as some appreciations of regulation theory 
still bear on old and superceded founding works' (1995a: 15, my translation). This 
admonition must be taken seriously. Indeed, given the vast range of recent work 
emanating from this school and its disciples, references in many critiques are often 
woefully limited to a couple of pioneer texts and some standard (and frequently out-
dated) secondary works. This observation does mean the RA is beyond criticism. It 
does suggest the need for more balanced and up-to-date commentaries. This can be 
shown by re-examining some standard criticisms. 
 
The RA has been criticized on several counts. Firstly, it is accused of functionalism, i.e., 
of assuming that MoRs emerge in order to meet certain functional needs of pre-given 
ARs. Even if true of cavalier theoretical appropriations and/or political vulgarizations of 
the RA, it never really held for the pioneer texts. These stressed the discontinuities in 
ARs and the problematic emergence of new MoRs through search processes and class 
struggles. Further theoretical work on this issue has produced a well-rehearsed 
response. MoRs are actually 'chance discoveries' which co-evolve with, and thereby co-
determine, ARs. This excludes both teleological accounts suggesting that MoRs arise in 
order to consolidate an existing AR; and those ex post functionalist accounts arguing 
that an existing AR will be consolidated only if an appropriate MoR can be discovered 
and instituted. A third-generation anti-functionalist response is that ARs are co-
produced through attempts at regulation. They do not pre-exist MoRs. Instead the 
spaces and scales on which they operate, their temporal rhythms, their crisis-
tendencies, and so on, in short, their basic features and structural forms, are the 
product of attempts to envision, institute, and consolidate a more or less coherent and 
manageable set of economic relations and their extra-economic conditions of existence 
(cf. Jessop 1995b, 1997b; Lipietz 1987). 
 
Secondly, some critics claim the RA is structuralist. It allegedly attributes iron laws of 
motion to capitalism and prioritizes structures over agency. It supposedly believes in 
objective and immutable laws of capitalism operating 'behind the backs of the 
producers'; and so it either ignores class struggle or treats it as a ruse of capitalism's 
self-development. From the outset, however, almost all regulationists regarded 
economic laws as mediated in and through specific institutions and practices and 
argued that no MoR contains class struggles for ever. Remember, too, that the RA 
originated in attempts to explain the genesis and crisis of Fordism in the USA and 
France; and that its pioneers emphasized the historical variability of capitalist crisis-
tendencies. Subsequent theoretical work has also shown that the so-called 'laws' of 
capitalism are, in fact, 'doubly tendential'. Not only do they operate as tendencies (with 
counter-tendencies) which are realized only in specific conditions; they are themselves 
tendential, i.e., they operate as tendencies only insofar as the social relations in which 
they are inscribed as emergent properties12 are 'reproduced-regularized' through a 
complex web of social practices (cf. Jessop 1990a; Lipietz 1993, 1997). This response 
is, of course, wholly consistent with that to charges of functionalism. 
 
The other side of this two-edged criticism is also wrong. Not only can the the 'laws' of 
capitalism be grounded in an extended regulation of social relations of production, there 
has also been growing interest in the micro-foundations of this regulation and in the best 
way to describe and explain social agency. Although Aglietta has since indicated that 
his initial work was inspired by Bourdieu's sociology and Foucault's micro-physics of 
power (see Dosse 1992b: 338), more recent Parisian RA work has moved away from 
such sociological concerns. A lively debate has ensued among some French 
regulationists about the suitability of 'methodological individualist' micro-foundations 
drawn from rational choice, game-theoretic, transactions costs, and conventionalist 
approaches (see Jessop 1997a). There have also been suggestions about how to link 
regulation to social, rather than methodologically individualist, accounts of agency. The 
latter range from a Giddensian structurationist approach, which merely emphasizes the 
'duality of structure and agency' (e.g., Esser et al., 1994) and the analogous 
appropriation of Bourdieu's concept of 'habitus' (cf. Painter 1997) through the strategic-
relational approach (cf. Jessop 1990) to concerns with the 'assujettissement'13 of agents 
as imperfect bearers of incomplete capitalist relations of production (Scherrer 1995) and 
analysis of identity struggles in and during crises of accumulation (Jenson 1990, 1991). 
In one case, this concern with social agency even extends to the embodiment of 
regulation in the transformation of bodies (Wark 1994). 
 
Thirdly, some argue that regulationism is too simplistic, reducing postwar history to an 
inevitable transition from a stable Fordism to a stable post-Fordism. This criticism would 
be better aimed at its superficial reception. It also ignores the RA's emphasis on 
historical specificity and the widening empirical scope of recent regulationist work. Thus 
second- and third-generation studies have demonstrated the wide range of ARs that co-
existed in Atlantic Fordism's orbit as well as the obstacles encountered and overcome in 
stabilizing these regimes in all their rich variety during 'les trente glorieuses'. There are 
also many studies of peripheral Fordisms and other types of AR outside the main circuit 
of Atlantic Fordism and a growing appreciation of the other scales on which local and/or 
regional ARs were organized. Moreover, as indicated above, there is now considerable 
interest in alternative trajectories beyond Fordism and in the many complex problems of 
achieving them. Indeed, it is one of the more salutary lessons learnt by the RA over the 
last twenty years (which have coincided, of course, with the Fordist crisis and its still 
unresolved aftermath) that there are no easy roads to re-regularizing capitalism. 
Certainly no-one any longer suggests, as Boyer once did in his critical presentation of 
the RA and proposals for a second-generation of research, that it would be possible to 
undertake 'real time' observation of crisis-resolution (Boyer 1970b: 111)! 
 
Fourthly, the very idea of 'regulation' is said to imply that conscious action (most 
notably, state intervention) can somehow suspend capital's contradictions and guide 
accumulation without crises. This charge is rooted in anglophone confusion between 
régulation (social regularization) and legal or state regulation (which would be termed 
réglementation in French). But it may have acquired some credence because of the 
technocratic basis of the first generation RA and their initial interest in the state's 
primary role in codifying the institutionalized compromise necessary to any 
accumulation 'en regime'. This heightens the paradox that most RA scholars have 
actually shown little interest in the details of economic policy or any forms of state 
intervention. This can be linked to the RA's initial theoretical concern with the origins of 
crisis rather than any possible policy-induced or state-engineered escape therefrom 
(Lordon 1995). But more recent work has begun remedying this neglect through 
theoretical and empirical research on the mode of public presence in the economy, on 
economic policy, and on issues of economic governance, i.e., the various forms of 
strategic coordination of interdependent economic activities. In this light, MoRs define 
the parameters within which governance operates. Structural forms should not be 
understood as mechanisms that ensure a simple repetition of routine behaviours but, 
rather, as relatively coherent frameworks providing a repertoire of responses which may 
secure some partial, localized, and temporary control in a turbulent, crisis-prone 
environment. As Boyer and Saillard note, the concept of 'mode of development does not 
imply identical reproduction but, on the contrary, inscription into the time of history: 
surviving unforeseen events, moving through cycles, progressively altering institutional 
forms, [and even] opening up the possibility of evolutions so contradictory they become 
explosive' (Boyer and Saillard 1995a: 64; cf., on the ebb and flow of diverse regulatory 
practices, Painter and Goodwin 1995). And, if there is no quasi-automatic reproduction, 
actions make a difference. In periods en régulation, regulation and governance occur 
within parameters defined by institutionalized structural forms, during periods of 
structural crisis they are more experimental, trial-and-error, and chaotic. This search 
process is a source of institutional and behavioural variation; more successful 
experiments are selected in an ex post manner; and, through their co-evolution, are re-
institutionalized and retained as the basis for a new repertoire of governance 
mechanisms. This concern with agency should not be confused, however, with an 
explicit, state-centred, top-down account of regulation. Instead it emphasizes the 
necessity and fragility of attempts to regularize and govern a complex economic and 
extra-economic process. 
 
Finally, it is alleged that, because regulation theorists have speculated about new forms 
of compromise which might help to stabilize a post-Fordist capitalism, they are mere 
political reformists. There is no obvious single political message entailed in the RA, 
however; regulationist positions range from social democracy to political ecology, from 
radical reformism to self-management, from the defense of Keynesian welfarism to 
'progressive competitiveness', from economic nationalism to advocacy of a social 
Europe. Indeed, as the RA has been incrementally extended, progressively deepened, 
and radically reconstructed, it has become far less determinate in its political 
implications. It would, in any case, be wrong to sacrifice the RA's major heuristic 
potential of secondary disagreements over political issues. 
V - Concluding Remarks 
 
There is a paradox in the influence achieved by the RA. It has been very influential 
theoretically in many social science disciplines and it is has also had a major impact on 
research agendas in many different fields of study. Yet it has failed to realize key 
elements of its original scientific and political agenda. It aimed to transform the field of 
economics by a direct assault on the basic assumptions of the 'standard' model and to 
re-orient it in an evolutionary, institutional, and sociological direction. The Parisian 
school could also be interpreted, on the basis of its critique of structural marxism, as 
wishing to transform the sociological understanding of capitalism by integrating the 
economic and extra-economic moments. In both respects its expectations have been 
disappointed. It finds itself isolated in relation to mainstream economics and it has not 
convinced the other social sciences to take serious account of structural economic 
forms and mechanisms. Nor did it gain significant influence over state policy in France 
even when the political conjuncture seemed favourable. 
 
The Parisian school has reacted to its isolation in mainstream economics in three ways. 
First, it has borrowed from other social sciences to lend it legitimacy. The mainstream, 
however, remains unconvinced. Second, it has tried to find micro-economic foundations 
for the RA which would substitute those of homo economicus. Of particular significance 
here are transaction costs analysis and the sociology of conventions. And, third, it has 
sought a rapprochement with other forms of institutional and evolutionary economics. 
But the RA has not broken through the defense mechanisms of the hermetically closed 
'standard' theory. The latter has recuperated these and many other attacks (as 
anticipated, for the RA, by Cartelier and de Vroey 1990). It still prefers to explain the 
economy in narrow economic terms even as it pursues 'economic imperialism' in other 
disciplines through the extension of its assumptions and economic modelling to other 
areas. The RA has failed to win the battle in economics -- which largely remains 
resolutely committed to explaining the economic within a narrow, anti-institutionalist 
framework and has also contrived to export this framework into other social sciences. 
Thus Boyer was led to comment, in self-evident frustration, on the paradox that, 
'whereas neo-classical methodology enjoys an hegemony [in economics] that is 
supposed to produce a cumulative research programme, its results are actually more 
contradictory than ever. In contrast, regulation theory is multiplying its methodological 
tools -- thereby giving the impression of fragmentation -- but is simultaneously delivering 
a series of clearly convergent conclusions which are refined compared to the 
beginnings in the 1970s' (Boyer 1995b: 23, my translation). 
 
At the same time, the Parisian RA has failed in its objectives even where it has seemed 
most successful. For its message to other social sciences has been mis-read, rejected, 
or blurred. Its proselytization attempts have typically been one-sidedly appropriated by 
other social sciences. Recall here that the RA tried to correct the one-sidedness of 
mainstream economics by stressing the need to complement the study of economic 
mechanisms of reproduction with that of extra-economic mechanisms of régulation. 
Whereas mainstream economics has largely ignored the role of régulation, however, 
other social sciences have largely ignored the role of market-mediated reproduction. 
The early RA was much interested in the specificities of 'stagflation' (stagnation and 
inflation) and the nature of money; although this particular symptom of the Atlantic 
Fordist crisis is not significant in after-Fordism, this does not justify neglect of economic 
forms and their role by other social sciences.14 Yet, for most social scientists, the RA is 
equated with analysis of social embeddedness, with the social dimensions of MoRs, and 
with the extra-economic dimensions of capitalism. By and large they neglect the 
specifically economic aspects of such structural forms as the commodity, the wage-
relation, money, credit, taxation, the price mechanism, changing forms of competition, 
etc. -- the realm of 'hard' political economy rather than 'soft' economic sociology. 
 
There are two further areas where the RA can be said to have failed in its 
proselytization attempts outside mainstream economics. The micro-foundations it 
proposed as alternatives to the neo-classical paradigm have been rejected by social 
scientists in favour of other accounts. This is seen in attempts to ground 'régulation' in 
structuration theory, in discourse analysis, in the strategic-relational approach, etc.. This 
is hardly surprising as recently proposed Parisian micro-foundations have de-radicalized 
the original marxist-inspired analysis in favour of forms of methodological individualism 
and encouraged a retreat towards game-theoretic or transaction costs analyses. And, 
finally, as other forms of institutional and evolutionary economics have been developed, 
it has become less clear what is distinctive about the RA. Its message has been 
dissipated within a more general appreciation of the importance of institutional and 
evolutionary approaches to economic analysis. Nor has the RA's attempted 
rapprochement with other approaches helped here. 
 
These remarks might well suggest that the RA has been a double failure. For one might 
well conclude that it has failed to convince mainstream economists that economics 
should cease to regard extra-economic phenomena as irrelevant or marginal, ceteris 
paribus issues; and it has failed to convince mainstream social scientists that 
accumulation cannot be explained without reference to economic as well as extra-
economic mechanisms. But this does not justify the conclusion that twenty years of the 
RA has not really been worth it. Academic debates are themselves socially embedded 
and it would be quite unreasonable to expect the RA to dislodge the standard theory 
when there are many vested interests in the latter's survival. Moreover, despite this 
double disappointment in terms of two key parts of its original project, there have been 
many successes. However one-sided the reception of its own dialectical message 
beyond the original Parisian school, the latter has certainly proved capable of continuing 
to develop the original approach in regard to economic and extra-economic 
mechanisms alike. It has had an enormous catalytic impact in reorienting social and 
economic analysis in the social sciences -- even if this has occurred in ways not 
originally intended. It has made major contributions to the overall analysis of 
accumulation as a socially embedded, socially regulated process. Its disciples have 
placed the contingent periodization of capitalism on the agenda; highlighted the crisis of 
Atlantic Fordism and the search for post-Fordist trajectories; explained different crisis 
forms (stagflation, etc.); shed new light on the economic role of the state; studied 
changing forms of international15ization; studied the nestedness of different 
accumulation regimes and modes of regulation; revealed the importance of the 
production of space and scale; applied the RA productively to post-socialism and East 
Asian NICs; generated work on Japan, the labour process, etc.. By most reasonable 
standards, this is no mean achievement. Even more important, the RA remains a 




                                                          
Endnotes 
1 I have benefitted from discussions with so many regulationists it would be invidious to name just a few. Earlier 
versions were presented at Manchester University and the Wessex Geographers' Research Workshop. The research 
was partly funded by an ESRC Local Governance Programme grant (L 31125302). The usual disclaimers apply. 
2 On the grounds that all individuals have perfect knowledge about the future and no individual's actions can affect 
the overall development of the market. 
3 Because the market mechanism permits a return to previous positions. 
4 And, against the Keynesian alternative, that they matter in more than an instrumental manner (Dosse 1992: 336). 
5 Both aspects are discussed under the rubric of 'approfondissement' (deepening) in Boyer and Saillard (1995). 
6 The phrase comes from Vercellone (1994). 
7 He introduced the acronym 'ÉRIC' (l'État relationel intégral complexe) to describe this approach. 
8 Aglietta, for example, noted how the low-inflation, export-oriented German economy was structurally coupled to 
the high-inflation French economy which imported German goods and compensated for inflation by periodic 
devaluations (1982). Likewise, Mistral suggested 'the stability of an international regime rests on the conformity of 
the map of the international division of labour with the forms of regulation' (1986: 188). 
9 Sicherheit refers here both to social security and the welfare state and to the state's disciplinary surveillance of 
society to protect national security (Hirsch 1984; 1995). 
10 The concept of 'competition state' derives from Cerny (1992). 
11 A third trend is the internationalization of policy regimes. 
12 Or, in critical realist terms, inscribed as 'natural necessities'. 
13 'Assujettissement' refers to the complex process of forming subjects. 
14 For a contrasting example, from a non-regulationist economist, see Gough's value-theoretical work, which covers 
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